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ABSTRACT 
 
Based on 2005 estimates of National Transfer Accounts for South Africa, this paper 
investigates the resource flows across ages within the generational economy. The paper 
provides estimates of the lifecycle deficit and describes the financing of the deficit. The final 
section of the paper discusses the first and second demographic dividends and looks at 
potential policy options that would help the country maximise the benefit that arises through 
the demographic transition. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
South Africa's highly unequal society is reflected in its economy, in which a sophisticated 
modern sector with high incomes exists alongside a low income informal sector. High levels 
of unemployment and widespread poverty remain two of the most pressing socioeconomic 
issues facing the country. One of the policy responses has been to gradually expand the 
country's social welfare system. As a result, South Africa has, by middle income country 
standards, a reasonably well-developed welfare system that covers children, the elderly and 
the disabled. Thus, by early 2013, there were roughly 16.1 million grant beneficiaries in 
South Africa (SASSA, 2013, p.1). 
 
South Africa has a relatively young population, with around half the population under the age 
of 25 years. Population growth generally ranged between 2.0 and 2.5 percent per annum 
since the mid-1960s, until the advent of the HIV/Aids pandemic that slowed population 
growth dramatically during the 2000s. Fertility rates have been in decline since at least 1960. 
South Africa's four race groups each began the demographic transition in order of declining 
income: Whites, whose mean incomes have historically been highest, were first to 
experience fertility and mortality declines, followed by Asians, Coloureds and then Africans. 
As a result, the South African population is poised for significant aging over the next century. 
This process of aging has important implications for the provision of public services, the 
labour market, and the need for retirement savings, amongst others. 
 
The aging of South African society represents an important opportunity. The transition from 
high fertility and high mortality, to low fertility and low mortality results in a transitory shift in 
the composition of the population until a new steady state is achieved. Specifically, since 
mortality declines before fertility, the demographic transition creates a boom generation: a 
series of cohorts that are unusually large. The immediate effect is to place pressure on 
working-age cohorts, who face increased demands on the resources earned. However, as 
fertility falls and these large cohorts age, the working age population grows relative to the 
dependent population. This fall in dependency releases resources that can be used to raise 
living standards, invest in human capital or save, and is termed the first demographic 
dividend. 
 
This paper uses the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) methodology to analyse the 
demographic dividend that will arise as the South African population ages. The NTA 
methodology focuses on what is referred to as the generational economy, defined as: (1) the 
social institutions and economic mechanisms used by each generation or age group to 
produce, consume, share, and save resources; (2) the economic flows across generations or 
age groups that characterize the generational economy; (3) explicit and implicit contracts 
that govern intergenerational flows; (4) the intergenerational distribution of income or 
consumption that results from the foregoing (Lee and Mason, 2011, p.7). 
 
There are four activities that are central to the generational economy, namely working, 
consuming, sharing and saving (Mason and Lee, 2011b, p.7). Consumption occurs 
throughout the lifecycle, although the level varies by age. Working, however, does not occur 
across all ages, particularly amongst the very young and the very old. As a result, the young 
and old are typically unable to finance their consumption on their own. Sharing and saving, 
then, represent the only means through which the young and old are able to bridge this gap. 
 
This paper estimates the full set of National Transfer Accounts for South Africa for 2005, 
using a variety of data sources including household survey data, national accounts data and 
published administrative data. Based on these accounts, the demographic dividend will be 
quantified. Importantly, the policy implications of the preceding findings will be explored in 
the final section of the paper, with a particular focus on how South Africa can capture and 
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maximise the potential benefits presented to it by its changing demographic composition 
over the coming decades. 
 
2. THE NATIONAL TRANSFER ACCOUNTS FRAMEWORK 
 
Given that the NTA methodology is extensive and detailed, this section provides a brief 
conceptual overview of the methodology, which has been developed and refined through 
and international research effort. The technical detail of the methodology can be located in 
the NTA manual (Mason et al., 2009), as well as various other publications (see, for 
example, Lee and Mason, 2011). 
 
The key technical aim of NTA is to be able to quantify economic flows for single-year age 
cohorts, from the very youngest to the very oldest. These economic flows are important 
because they reflect a fundamental feature of all societies: the economic lifecycle (Mason 
and Lee, 2011a, p.55). For any individual, inflows must equal outflows and the following 
identity holds: Y l+ Y A + Ƭ+ =C + Ƭ - + S. In other words, individuals can receive resource 
inflows in the form of labour income (Y l), asset income (Y A) and transfer inflows (Ƭ+), and 
they have three ways in which to use them: consumption (C), transfers to others (i.e. transfer 
outflows) (Ƭ -) and savings (S). Rearranging the terms, the NTA is governed by the following 
identity for each age cohort (x), first presented by Lee (1994): 
 
C(x) - Y l (x) = Ƭ+ (x) - Ƭ - (x) + Y A (x) - S(x)    (1) 
 
On the left side of the identity is the lifecycle deficit – the difference at each age between 
consumption and labour income. Where consumption is greater than labour income, the 
lifecycle deficit is positive (a lifecycle surplus, where labour income is greater than 
consumption, is then negative). Consumption includes both private consumption (e.g. private 
spending on food, education, or entertainment) and public consumption (consumption 
spending by the state on education, health or other items). 
 
The first two terms on the right side of the identity, Ƭ+ (x) - Ƭ - (x), are net transfers. Transfers 
are unique flows in that they involve no quid pro quo (Lee, 1994, p.18). As with consumption, 
transfers can be either private or public transfers, depending on the identity of the other 
party. Private transfers can occur within households or between households, e.g. remittance 
flows between households, or the transfer of food and shelter from a parent to a child within 
a household. Public transfers occur between individuals and the state, with public transfer 
outflows being taxes and inflows being cash or in-kind transfers from the state. Through 
transfers, resources can be transferred across generations, with the transfers mediated by 
households or the state. 
 
Finally, the final two terms on the right side of the identity, Y A (x) - S(x), are known as asset-
based reallocations. Once again there is a public-private split, with both types of flows used 
to reallocate resources across ages. For example, resources are transferred from younger to 
older ages through the process of saving for retirement: saving for retirement during the 
working ages represents an outflow at that age, while dissaving during retirement represents 
an inflow at older ages. Asset income can be earned from assets owned (by individuals or 
the state), but asset income can also be paid to others. 
 
There are a couple of important points to be made with respect to National Transfer 
Accounts. First, the unit of analysis in the NTA is the individual. All flows within the economy 
are allocated to individuals through various methods and assumptions. Although this is very 
useful from the perspective of understanding the impact of aging on the economy, it means 
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that flows within and often between households are difficult to allocate directly using survey 
data. Thus, for example, household consumption of certain items is allocated on the basis of 
equivalence scales, since it is not possible to discern consumption at the level of individuals 
within the household. 
 
Second, and this is one of the key differences between NTA and the System of National 
Accounts (SNA), the NTA consolidates all private sectors (i.e. households, financial and non-
financial corporations, and non-profit institutions serving households) into one. Thus, “asset 
income for each age group comprises all asset income, including the operating surplus of 
corporations, whether distributed through dividends or not [and] private saving includes both 
household and corporate saving” (Mason and Lee, 2011a, p.60). 
 
Third, the NTA uses basic prices to estimate consumption and labour and asset income. 
This means that “income and consumption are valued prior to the assessment of taxes on 
production and products, also known as indirect taxes”, with the implication that public 
transfer outflows include all taxes (Mason and Lee, 2011a, p.60). 
 
The overall process that is followed in the estimation of the various flows is as follows. First, 
the aim is to estimate an age shape for the given flow. The age shape or the age profile is 
essentially a line graph of the mean per capita value of the flow (on the vertical axis) at each 
age or for each age cohort (with age on the horizontal axis). Next, the per capita age profile 
is combined with a national population distribution to arrive at an aggregate value for the age 
profile. For example, the national population distribution is combined with the age profile of 
employment earnings to derive an aggregate value for employment earnings for the 
economy (i.e. number of individuals in each cohort multiplied by the mean per capita value 
for each cohort). Third, an aggregate control value is calculated on the basis of national 
accounts and other data. The ratio between these two aggregates, the aggregate value 
derived on the basis of the survey and population distribution data vs. the aggregate value 
derived from national accounts data, is used to adjust, multiplicatively, the estimated age 
profile either upwards or downwards. The various age profiles are then aggregated to derive 
the profiles of transfers, asset-based reallocations and the lifecycle deficit. 
 
3. SOUTH AFRICA'S LIFECYCLE DEFICIT 
3.1 Labour Income 
Neglect of the broader education system and the systematic denial of equal opportunities 
under apartheid have left South Africa as one of the most unequal societies in the world. 
This situation has been exacerbated since 1994 by the continuation of the skills-biased and 
relatively capital intensive economic growth path followed by the South African economy. 
The Gini coefficient – an inequality measure where a value of zero indicates perfect equality 
and a value of one perfect inequality – for South Africa is consistently estimated within the 
range of 0.60 and 0.80, depending on the data used. Based on income data in the National 
Income Dynamics Survey (Wave 2, 2010/2011), the Gini coefficient is estimated at 0.68 
(Finn et al., 2012, p.33). 
 
Labour income is composed of employment earnings and self-employment earnings. 
Overall, labour income (YL) totals roughly R790.1 billion in 2005, of which R713.0 billion (or 
90.2 percent) is employment earnings.1 Figure 1 presents the per capita age profiles of 
labour income and its components, relative to mean labour income for 30 to 49 year olds.2 
                                                   
1 For an overview of the data used to construct the various age profiles presented here, see Appendix A. 
 
2 Flows presented in this paper have all been normalised in this way, unless otherwise stated, and values are 
quantified as proportions of `peak labour income'. 
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Perhaps a key feature of the labour income profile is its relatively late increase above zero. 
Labour income for 25 year olds is just 41.6 percent of peak labour income, of which 94 
percent is derived from employment. Peak labour income is reached at age 35 and rarely 
exceeds that level by more than ten percent in the 20 cohorts whose normalised labour 
income exceeds 1.0. While employment earnings are relatively constant from the mid-thirties 
to the mid-fifties, self-employment income increases with age, peaking between the ages of 
48 and 55. However, self-employment earnings are far outweighed by employment earnings, 
which only accounts for less than 80 percent of labour income amongst those under the age 
of 16, and those over the age of 63. 
 
The considerable difference in employment and self-employment earnings relates to 
relatively low rates of pay in the informal sector, low levels of engagement in the informal 
sector and a relatively weak small business sector in South Africa. The ILO International 
Labour Organisation (2011) estimates that the informal sector accounted for 17.8 percent of 
total employment in 2010, a very low proportion when compared with other African countries 
(only Mauritius has a lower proportion at 9.3 percent in 2009). Even amongst middle income 
countries, the informal sector is small: it accounts for 24.3 percent of Brazilian non-
agricultural employment in 2009, and roughly one-third in Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico and 
Uruguay. Productivity in the South African informal sector is also relatively low, with 
“productivity in the modal formal firm [being] several times higher than in the modal informal 
firm” (Gelb et al., 2009, p.6). 
 
Figure 1: Labour Income, 2005 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The rise in the employment earnings profile is delayed relative to other NTA countries, a 
result of high youth unemployment rates, which exceeded 60 percent between the ages of 
15 and 23 years in 2005, using the expanded definition of unemployment, and only fall below 
40 percent after age 29. Another contributing factor is educational enrolment that is relatively 
high at 42 percent amongst 20 year olds and 18 percent amongst 22 year olds, thereby 
delaying labour market entry. 
 
Another important feature of the age profile is the pace at which it declines after the age of 
58 years. On average, normalised labour income declines by more 8.6 percentage points 
per year of age from age 57 to age 65, at which point it is just one-quarter of peak labour 
income. This is certainly related to age-eligibility for the state old age pension, which at the 
time was 60 years for women and 65 years for men. Given its relatively generous size – at 
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R820 per month, it is equivalent to 23.9 percent of peak labour income – it is not unexpected 
that it might incentivise exit from the labour market around the age of eligibility. At the very 
least, there are significant numbers of individuals in their late 50s and early 60s for whom 
there is little difference between labour income and the state OAP. 
 
3.2 Consumption 
 
Within NTA, consumption is comprised of private consumption and public consumption. 
Within each, education and health consumption are distinguished, due to their particular 
relationships with age. 
 
3.2.1 Private Consumption 
 
Private education consumption represents all spending by households on education. As 
such, the characterisation ‘private’ does not refer to the type of institution, but rather 
distinguishes spending on education by households from spending on education by 
government. Private education consumption covers spending by households on tuition, 
school supplies (including books and stationery), and tutoring and extra lessons. 
 
In the absence of data linking expenditures on education to specific household members, 
some method of allocating household education expenditures to household members 
attending an educational institution must be found. The most common method involves a 
regression model that estimates household consumption of education as a function of the 
number of enrolled members and the number of enrolled members of each age (Mason et 
al., 2009, p.13). Unfortunately, the IES 2005/06 contains no information on enrolment status 
of household members, and its standalone nature does not allow for any linking of other 
datasets that may contain such information. Instead, we turn to the General Household 
Survey (GHS) 2005, which includes information on individuals' attendance status and 
highest level of education. Within the IES 2005/06, tuition and attendance fees are 
disaggregated by level – preschool, primary, secondary, tertiary – and, while other 
education-related expenses are often not disaggregated by level, some are. Private 
consumption of education is therefore dealt with separately by level of education, specifying 
‘college’ (post-secondary non-tertiary colleges and tertiary institutions known then as 
technikons) and ‘other’ in addition to preschool, primary, secondary and tertiary. Spending 
that cannot be allocated to a particular educational level is dealt with separately. Age-
specific attendance rates – proxies for enrolment – are estimated from the GHS 2005 for 
each of the six educational categories. 
 
The process of deriving age profiles of spending on a particular level of education is as 
follows. Attendance rates by age for that level of education are summed within each 
household. Spending is estimated as a function of these summed attendance rates across 
the relevant ages. In other words, for primary education, age-specific attendance rates are 
summed within households from ages 6 through 14, and these summed attendance rates 
are entered as independent variables in the regression explaining spending. Coefficients on 
the independent variables represent spending per age (e.g. primary education spending on 
10 year olds) and are allocated to all individuals of that particular age in each household. 
Within each household, allocated coefficients are summed across ages for that particular 
level of education (e.g. across all six to 14 year olds in the case of primary education). 
Spending is allocated to a particular individual on the basis of that individual's share within 
the sum of the coefficients. Once these allocations have been made, across all levels of 
education, age profiles are generated in the standard way, rendering per capita expenditure 
on private education by individual year of age, which are then aggregate controlled. 
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Since the IES 2005/06 does not allocate health spending to specific household members, 
private consumption of health is allocated on the basis of utilisation. The GHS 2005 is once 
again used, this time to construct an age profile (in five-year age groups) of utilisation rates 
using data on whether or not individuals visited a medical practitioner in the month preceding 
the survey. The data reveals a standard J-curve for utilisation rates: utilisation amongst 
infants under the age of one, is 13.2 percent; falling to below six percent for those between 
11 and 20 years; and then gradually rising again to over 25 percent amongst individuals over 
the age of 75. Although various options of allocating health expenditure were investigated, 
the only method that yielded satisfactory results was the method described for education 
above.  
 
All other consumption by households is allocated to individuals using an equivalence scale. 
The use of an equivalence scale is preferred within the NTA methodology to other methods 
due to the fact that they generate more reliable results (Mason et al., 2009, p.15). In terms of 
the chosen equivalence scale, adults aged 20 and over are assigned weights of one, while 
children aged four or younger are assigned a weight of 0.4. Between the ages of four and 
20, individuals are assigned a weight on the assumption that there is a linear increase in the 
value from 0.4 to 1.0, i.e. for each year over the age of four, the weight increases by 0.0375. 
Within each household, then, weights in terms of this equivalence scale are summed across 
individuals and expenditures are allocated to individuals in proportion to their weight within 
the total weight for the household. This equivalence scale is adjusted slightly for allocating 
alcohol and tobacco consumption by setting weights equal to zero for children under the age 
of 15 years in the case of tobacco, and for children under the age of 17 years in the case of 
alcohol (16 and 18 years being the legal ages for smoking and alcohol consumption in South 
Africa). 
 
Other private consumption represents all consumption spending as reported in the IES 
2005/06, less consumption spending on education and health. However, in their revision of 
the consumer price index (CPI) weights, Statistics South Africa made significant adjustments 
to certain types of expenditures (Statistics South Africa, 2008a, pp.6-8). Specifically, 
adjustments were made to four categories, namely food and non-alcoholic beverages; 
personal care items; restaurants; and alcoholic beverages and tobacco. These adjustments 
do not affect the aggregate control value used, but may alter the shape of the other private 
consumption profile, as well as that of consumption taxes (various food items are VAT 
exempt, while excise duties are levied on alcoholic beverages and tobacco). For food and 
non-alcoholic beverages, the adjusted value was 30.5 percent higher; for personal care it 
was 42.0 percent higher; for restaurants it was 55.3 percent higher; and for alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco it was 440.6 percent higher, reflecting massive under-reporting in 
this category. 
 
The age profiles of private consumption and its components are presented in Figure 2. 
Private consumption is dominated by other consumption, which typically accounts for more 
than 80 percent of total private consumption. The only times when this proportion falls below 
80 percent are associated with the two peaks in the private education consumption profile 
between ages four and seven, and between ages 14 and 17. Private education consumption 
is very low relative to peak labour income. At its peak in the mid-teens, private education 
consumption ranges between five and seven percent of peak labour income and by age 23 
is below one percent. 
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Figure 2: Private Consumption, 2005 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Similarly, private health consumption is low relative to peak labour income, but tends to be 
greater than private education consumption. It is only during the teenage years that private 
education consumption is significantly higher than that of health. Private health consumption 
follows the J-curve pattern, falling from 2.3 percent of peak labour income for infants under 
the age of one, to below 1.2 percent for 18 and 19 year olds, before rising again and peaking 
at just under eight percent in the late fifties. Other private consumption rises rapidly from less 
than 12 percent of peak labour income for children under the age of two years, to 30.9 
percent by age 20 and to 50.6 percent at age 30. For those between the ages of 42 and 53, 
other private consumption ranges between 60 percent and 62 percent of peak labour 
income, falling quite steeply thereafter. By age 75, other private consumption is just 40.9 
percent of peak labour income. 
 
Given the dominance of other private consumption, total private consumption has a similar 
age profile. There are two local peaks associated with education consumption and the gap 
between total and other private consumption grows with age as a result of rising health 
consumption. Total private consumption peaks at more than two-thirds of peak labour 
income for cohorts between the ages of 44 and 54 years. 
 
3.2.2 Public Consumption 
 
Public consumption of education can be disaggregated by the type of institution or level of 
education. Using provincial and national budgets, total consumption spending on education 
is disaggregated into spending on pre-primary, primary, and secondary education, Further 
Education and Training (FET), university (tertiary, or higher, education), adult basic 
education and training (ABET) and ‘other’ education. To ensure compatibility with national 
accounts data, relative shares of each level of education within total spending are used to 
assign portions of the aggregate control value. Within each level of education, a cost per 
user is then calculated and multiplied by the number of users of a specific age. This amount 
– the total spend on an age cohort for a given level of education – is divided by the 
population estimate for that age cohort to arrive at per capita spending for that cohort for that 
level of education. 
 
Public health consumption is allocated using data from the GHS 2005, which asks 
respondents whether they consulted a health worker as a result of illness or injury in the 
preceding month and whether the consultation took place in the public or private health 
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sector. These questions enable the construction of a public sector health utilisation age 
profile. With no direct evidence on differing costs per consultation by age or by institution 
(e.g. hospital vs. clinic), age-specific mean utilisation rates are used to allocate consumption. 
In effect, this assumes a constant cost per consultation across institutions and by age. 
 
Other public consumption includes all other government consumption apart from education 
and health. There are two types of expenditures that fall within this category, namely those 
that vary with age and those that do not. In instances where consumption varies by age 
typically, programmes that are targeted or differentiated by age some differential allocation 
by age may be possible and preferred. However, where consumption does not vary by age, 
it is allocated on a simple per capita basis. 
 
Using the same scale as in Figure 2, Figure 3 shows that public consumption is relatively 
small relative to private consumption and relative to peak labour income. Public consumption 
of education is insignificant prior to the age of six – the first year of compulsory schooling – 
at which point it rises to 7.6 percent of peak labour income. Between the ages of seven and 
17, public education consumption is around 11 percent of peak labour income and it falls 
gradually to under two percent of peak labour income by age 24. Public consumption of 
health follows a similar J-curve pattern to private health consumption, but it only exceeds 
three percent of peak labour income for the first time at age 49. At its highest level, public 
health consumption reaches 4.9 percent of peak labour income in the late seventies. Other 
public consumption is just shy of ten percent of peak labour income for all ages, given that it 
is allocated on a per capita basis.  
 
Together then, public consumption is just over 12 percent of peak labour income for children 
under the age of five, rising steeply to 21.9 percent by age seven on the back of increased 
public education consumption. It is stable at this level until age 17, after which it declines in 
line with falling public education consumption. By age 28, public consumption is at its lowest 
point at 11.9 percent of peak labour income. As age continues to increase, so too does 
public consumption, peaking at just under 15 percent for individuals in their seventies and 
early eighties.  
 
Figure 3: Public Consumption, 2005 
 
 Source: Own calculations. 
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Within total consumption, as alluded to earlier, private consumption is dominant (Figure 4). 
Private consumption typically accounts for more than 70 percent of total consumption and it 
is only amongst the young that this is not the case. Public consumption is roughly equal to 
private consumption amongst children under the age of two, and for those between six and 
13 years of age. In fact, during the most of primary schooling years, public consumption 
exceeds private consumption. However, public consumption falls as a share of total 
consumption to under 17 percent by age 35 and, although it increases again from around 
age 50, it never really exceeds one-quarter of total consumption. 
 
Total consumption, therefore, rises from one-quarter of peak labour income at age zero, to 
55 percent at age 17 on the back of increased education consumption, both public and 
private. Falling slightly to 51 percent at age 21, it again increases, driven by private 
consumption. At age 47, total consumption exceeds 80 percent of peak labour income for 
the first time and it remains above this threshold until age 56. Interestingly, and somewhat 
uniquely amongst NTA countries, total consumption then falls consistently and significantly 
with age: it falls below 70 percent of peak labour income at age 67, and below 60 percent at 
age 81. By the late eighties, total consumption is just 55 percent of peak labour income and 
around one-third below its own peak level. 
 
This continual and significant decline in total consumption amongst older cohorts is an 
important finding and suggests weaknesses in the institutions – whether public or private – 
that, in most other countries, ensure that consumption amongst the elderly is maintained at 
levels comparable to that amongst prime working-age cohorts. Given South Africa's 
economic history over the past half-century and rising incomes particularly since the mid-
1990s, the observed pattern of total consumption is not simply a cohort effect. This is 
particularly evident when considering the age profiles of consumption in other developing 
countries and in countries that have experienced more rapid economic growth in the last few 
decades than South Africa. In effect, the problem appears to be related to the institutions 
that regulate the ‘sharing’ activity within the NTA framework, specifically inter-household 
sharing (or transfers) and the public transfer system. 
 
Figure 4: Total Consumption, 2005 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
3.3 The Lifecycle Deficit 
 
The lifecycle deficit is the difference between consumption and labour income. The labour 
income and consumption profiles presented above are combined in Figure 5 with the 
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resulting lifecycle deficit. The LCD curve displays the standard shape: positive and rising at 
the youngest ages; then falling in the ages of early labour market activity as labour income 
begins to rise; turning negative (to surplus) as labour income continues to rise; stabilising in 
surplus as both labour income and consumption stabilise; then rising rapidly and returning to 
deficit as retirement age is reached. Relative to mean labour income of 30 to 49 year olds, 
the LCD rises from roughly 25 percent at birth to just over 50 percent between the ages of 
14 and 18 years. The deficit then falls rapidly and, by age 34, the normalised surplus is 
almost 27 percent. The surplus then ranges between 25 percent and 30 percent until age 52, 
whereafter it declines and turns to deficit once more. From age 66 onwards, the normalised 
deficit breaches 50 percent and remains close to 60 percent until the mid-80s, declining very 
gradually thereafter. 
 
Figure 5: South Africa's Lifecycle Deficit, 2005 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Overall, South Africa's surplus lasts 30 years, from the ages of 30 to 59 years. While this 
places South Africa towards the middle of the group of NTA countries in terms of the 
duration of the surplus. Nevertheless, the transition to surplus comes relatively late in South 
Africa: only two NTA countries – Nigeria and Senegal – are not generating surpluses by age 
30, when South Africa (and Brazil) begin to produce a surplus. Similarly, by age 60, when 
South Africa returns to deficit, only three other NTA countries (Nigeria, Sweden and 
Uruguay) are still producing a surplus. 
 
Per capita age profiles, however, mask the extent of aggregate flows as they do not account 
for population structure. By weighting per capita profiles with age-specific population 
estimates, it is possible to generate an aggregate age profile, and these are presented in 
Figure 6. The aggregate age profile reveals that, since the South African population is 
relatively young, by far the larger portion of the lifecycle deficit is located amongst young 
people under the age of 30 years. Indeed, just 12.0 percent of the total surplus is accounted 
for by cohorts aged at least 60 years.  
 
Details on the aggregate flows that make up the LCD are tabulated in Table 2. These 
estimates are disaggregated into five broad age-groups. The estimated value of the lifecycle 
deficit for the population as a whole is R336.4 billion in 2005, with consumption totalling  
R1 126.5 billion and labour income R790.1 billion. The table shows that those under the age 
of 20 years have an aggregate lifecycle deficit of R338.2 billion, roughly equivalent to the 
deficit for the population as a whole. A further deficit of R80.0 billion is estimated for 
individuals in their twenties and this is approximately three-quarters greater than the deficit 
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estimated for those aged 65 years and older. In contrast, a total surplus of almost R128 
billion is estimated for individuals aged between 30 and 64 years. 
 
The analysis confirms strong age-based patterns in consumption and earnings for South 
Africa. As a result of the interaction between consumption – which rises rapidly for young 
people, stabilises and then declines from age 65 in particular – and labour income – which 
rises from early working ages, peaks between the ages of 40 and 55, and declines rapidly 
around the retirement age – a lifecycle surplus is generated between the ages of 30 and 59 
years. In aggregate terms, the lifecycle deficit is largely concentrated amongst the young, 
with the deficit for those under the age of 30 equivalent to almost one-quarter more than the 
deficit for the population as a whole. 
 
Figure 6: Aggregate Labour Income and Consumption, 2005 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
4. FINANCING SOUTH AFRICA'S LIFECYCLE DEFICIT 
 
4.1 Net Transfers 
 
4.1.1 Public Transfers 
 
Public transfers may be classified as either inflows (e.g. social grants) or outflows (e.g. 
value-added tax). Public transfer inflows consist of cash transfers to individuals and 
households, as well as in-kind transfers. In-kind transfers refer to “goods and services 
received directly from government agencies” (Mason and Lee, 2011a, p.66) and are, 
therefore, equivalent to public consumption – education, health and other consumption – as 
detailed above.  
 
The South African government has extensive social grant programmes targeted towards the 
poor, and specifically towards children and the elderly. Indeed, in the 2005/06 fiscal year, 
approximately R50 billion (equivalent to 3.2 percent of 2005 GDP) was spent on social 
grants. The state old age pension (OAP) is the largest programme, accounting for 38.4 
percent of the total, followed by the child support grant (CSG) and disability grant (DG), 
which each account for 27.8 percent of the total. The remaining grants – the war veterans 
grant, foster care grant, care dependency grant, grant-in-aid and relief of distress grant – 
together account for 6.0 percent.  
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Two other cash transfers explicitly modelled here are receipts from the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (UIF) and the Workmen's Compensation Fund (WCF). Unemployment 
insurance in South Africa is a social insurance programme, funded through employer and 
employee contributions of one percent each of covered earnings. The WCF provides 
benefits related to work injury and illness and is funded through employer insurance 
premiums. The UIF reported paying out R2.9 billion in unemployment, illness, 
maternity/adoption and dependent benefits, with unemployment benefits accounting for 
roughly three-quarters of the total amount. The WCF reported paying out just less than R2.1 
billion over the same period. 
 
Table 1: Lifecycle Deficit Detail, 2005 (R billions) 
 
Component Total 0-19 
years 
20-29 
years 
30-49 
years 
50-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Lifecycle Deficit 336.4 338.2 80.0 -111.0 -17.3 46.0 
Consumption 1127.0 342.2 207.9 369.7 154.3 53.0 
…Private Consumption 820.8 188.2 156.7 308.2 126.9 41.0 
……Education 24.6 22.3 1.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 
……Health 66.2 13.7 8.2 25.4 13.8 5.1 
……Other 730.0 152.1 146.7 282.4 113.1 36.0 
…Public Consumption 305.7 154.0 51.2 61.5 27.3 12.0 
……Education 73.4 60.4 9.7 2.9 0.4 0.0 
……Health 37.3 11.2 4.6 10.2 7.7 3.8 
……Other 195.0 82.4 36.9 48.4 19.3 8.0 
Less: Labour Income 790.1 3.9 127.9 480.3 171.6 6.5 
…Employment Earnings 713.0 3.6 119.8 437.2 147.8 4.6 
…Self-employment Earnings 77.2 0.3 8.1 43.1 23.7 1.9 
Population Share (Percent) 100.0 42.3 18.9 24.8 9.9 4.1 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Cash transfers from the state are allocated to those individuals for whom the transfers are 
intended. In other words, the old age pension is allocated to elderly individuals, while the 
child support grant is allocated to the child beneficiary (even though the grant is paid to the 
child's primary caregiver). The IES 2005/06 data on grant income required significant 
cleaning, with many individuals reporting too much grant income from a particular grant, 
while others reported receiving grants for which they were age-ineligible. To resolve these 
issues, the following procedure was followed. For each grant, an upper bound for each grant 
type was calculated using the grant amounts for 2006/07. Grant incomes above this amount 
are either incorrect or represent a misclassification of grants. In the case of old age 
pensions, nearly 200 observations report state old age pensions in excess of the relevant 
upper bound value. For these individuals, amounts reported as old age pensions are 
reclassified as private pensions.3 
 
Grant income is also adjusted to reflect legal age cut-offs associated with each grant. Thus, 
disability grants are reclassified as old age pensions for individuals of pensionable age, 
since this conversion is stipulated within the disability grant policy. Similarly, individuals who 
are not of pensionable age, but report receiving state pensions have their pensions 
                                                   
3 These adjustments bring down the number of individuals who claim to be receiving state old age pensions from 
2.4 million to just under 2.2 million individuals, which is in line with the official number of beneficiaries. 
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reclassified as private pension income. Various allocation rules are implemented to shift 
grant income between household members where it is apparent that respondents have 
misidentified the grants they received. 
 
Figure 7 presents the age profiles of cash and in-kind transfers from the state to individuals. 
By far the largest cash transfer in per capita terms is the old age pension. Inflows associated 
with the pension rise rapidly once the age of eligibility is reached: at age 60, OAP inflows 
average just 6.3 percent of mean labour income amongst 30 to 49 year olds, rising to 16.0 
percent by age 65 and remaining between 18 percent and 22 percent for those aged 69 
years and older. Amongst the youngest members of South African society, there are transfer 
inflows from the state in the form of family allowances. Normalised per capita family 
allowances quickly rise to over three percent of mean labour income amongst 30 to 49 year 
olds by age two, remaining around that level until age eight. Thereafter, transfers decline to 
2.5 percent by age 11 and below 0,5 percent after age 14. 
 
Figure 7: Public Transfer Inflows, 2005  
 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The third significant public transfer inflow is the disability grant. Individuals are only eligible 
for this grant from the age of 18 and it is converted to an old age pension at ages 60 and 65 
for women and men respectively. In line with the expected incidence of disability, inflows 
from the state in terms of disability grants rise gradually. Per capita disability inflows only 
breach one percent of mean labour income amongst 30 to 49 year olds at age 36, and two 
percent at age 46. At age 59 the age after which disability grants are converted to old age 
pensions normalised per capita inflows average five percent, after which they decline 
precipitously. Finally, inflows related to the UIF and WCF are small, peaking at less than 0.9 
percent of mean labour income amongst 30 to 49 year olds at age 55. 
 
In terms of in-kind transfers, inflows are biased towards younger ages since public 
consumption of education is so large. Even though health consumption is higher on a per 
capita basis for older individuals, it remains significantly lower than consumption of 
education. Overall, therefore, public transfer inflows are particularly high amongst the elderly 
– specifically from around age 60 onwards – and amongst primary school-aged children. For 
those aged more than 60 years, public transfer inflows are equivalent to between 25 percent 
and 37 percent of mean labour income amongst 30 to 49 year olds. Amongst children aged 
between seven and 13 years, public transfer inflows are roughly one-quarter of the level of 
mean labour income amongst 30 to 49 year olds. 
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Within the NTA framework, transfer inflows equal transfer outflows since for each outflow (or 
giver) there is an inflow (recipient). This applies to both private and public transfers and, in 
the case of the latter, implies equality in in- and outflows at both the aggregate and the 
programme level (Mason and Lee, 2011a, p.67). Public transfer outflows consist of taxes 
and social contributions paid and its age profile depends on the tax source, the age 
distribution of the tax source and any age variation in tax rates. Indeed, NTA does not 
distinguish social contributions from taxes. Instead, it distinguishes seven tax sources, 
namely labour income, asset income, consumption, asset holding, asset transactions, the 
rest of the world (ROW), and other. The source of each tax depends on the party, resource 
or activity assessed. Thus, for example, taxes on wages and earnings are paid out of labour 
income, while taxes on consumption are paid out of consumption.  
 
Tax revenues are either pooled in a general revenue fund or may be earmarked for use 
within a specific programme. An example of earmarked funding for specific programmes is 
that of pensions, which are often funded from payroll taxes. Similarly, a tax on fuel that is 
earmarked for road maintenance or grants from overseas governments for sole use within 
education would be other examples. In the case of pooled revenues, public transfer outflows 
for different programmes would have the same age profiles, while in the case of earmarked 
funds this is not true. Where there is fiscal federalism and different tiers of government are 
able to raise their own revenue in the form of taxes and are responsible for funding specific 
programmes, different age profiles of public transfer outflows will exist: [education] may be 
funded at the local level from property taxes while national [defence] is funded at the central 
level out of value-added taxes, for example (Mason and Lee, 2011a, p.68). 
 
The first step in estimating the age profile of public transfer outflows is calculating age 
profiles of labour income (for taxes on labour income), asset income (for taxes on asset 
income) and consumption (for taxes on consumption). These profiles are presented in Figure 
8. Taxes on labour income, which include payroll taxes for unemployment insurance, follow 
the shape of the labour income age profile and only begin to rise from zero at age 15. 
Remaining above 15 percent of mean labour income amongst 30 to 49 year olds between 
the ages of 33 and 56 years, taxes on labour begin to decline, first gradually and then 
rapidly, falling below one percent by age 70. Similarly, taxes on consumption follow the 
shape of private consumption and, for the youngest cohorts, are the only taxes paid. Taxes 
on consumption never reach as high as tax on labour income at its peak, ranking instead 
between 12 percent and 14 percent between the ages of 33 and 64 years. 
 
Taxes on capital, however, are quite different. NTA methodology assigns household-level 
asset income to household heads and, since household heads tend to be older than other 
household members, the age profile is skewed towards the right. Not all asset income is 
assigned to household heads, though, since some asset income categories (e.g. interest 
income) are reported at an individual level in the IES 2005/06. Tax on capital (or asset 
income) is very low for young people, only surpassing 2.5 percent of mean labour income 
amongst 30 to 49 year olds at age 29. However, from age 45 onwards, taxes on asset 
income are larger than those on both labour income and consumption and accounts for more 
than half of total taxes for individuals aged 58 and above. Indeed, for those aged 69 to 86 
years, taxes on asset income account for 70 percent to 75 percent of total public transfer 
outflows.  
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Figure 8: Public Transfer Outflows, 2005 
 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Total public transfer outflows peak in the fifties at more than 55 percent of mean labour 
income amongst 30 to 49 year olds. This peak is due to the fact that taxes on capital are 
nearing their peak, while taxes on labour have not yet begun their rapid decline. Up to the 
age of 20, total public transfer outflows are relatively low, but gradually increasing in line with 
the gradual rise in consumption. However, once labour income begins to pick up, taxes on 
labour rise quite rapidly, resulting in a rise in total public transfer outflows from 8.6 percent of 
mean labour income amongst 30 to 49 year olds at age 20 to over 40 percent by age 37. 
From there on, the rise in total public transfer outflows is essentially driven by the rise in 
taxes on asset income, while the decline after age 56 is largely the result of falling taxes on 
labour income until around age 70 and falling taxes on capital from around age 80. 
 
Combining public transfer inflows and outflows yields net public transfers, the age profile of 
which is presented in Figure 9. Significant public transfer inflows at young ages, combined 
with low outflows, mean that net public transfers are positive until the mid-twenties. Very 
young children have relatively small net public transfer inflows due to the fact that South 
Africa does not have significant educational or childcare programmes targeted at children 
below the age of six years. Indeed, inflows at these young ages are essentially cash 
transfers from the state in the form of the various family allowances. Net public transfers 
peak at ages seven through 12, during which time they range between 20 percent and 23 
percent of mean labour income amongst 30 to 49 year olds. 
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Figure 9: Net Public Transfers, 2005 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
At age 25, net public transfers become negative. The relatively rapid shift from net inflows to 
net outflows is the result of the decline in in-kind education transfers (an inflow) and the rise 
in outflows, driven primarily by taxes on labour. Normalised net outflows grow larger quite 
rapidly until the mid-thirties, breaching 21 percent at age 35, and more slowly thereafter. The 
largest normalised per capita net outflows are experienced by those in their fifties, with those 
aged 49 to 57 years typically experiencing net outflows of 30 percent. From the late fifties, 
however, falling taxes on labour combine with rising inflows to reduce the net public transfer 
outflow such that individuals aged 72 and above once again experience net public transfer 
inflows. Net inflows remain low throughout the seventies and into the early eighties, only 
surpassing five percent at 83 years, due to the existence of relatively large outflows 
associated with taxes on asset income. As these taxes fall, so the normalised net public 
transfer inflow for individuals in their eighties rises rapidly, although they barely reach half 
the peak net inflows recorded for children. 
 
4.1.2 Private Transfers 
 
There are two types of private transfers: inter-household transfers and intra-household 
transfers. Inter-household transfer inflows refer to all private transfers received by residents 
and include flows from other residents (i.e. domestic) and from non-residents (i.e. from the 
rest of the world). Similarly, inter-household transfer outflows include all private transfers 
made by residents, irrespective of whether the recipient is resident in the country or not. Net 
inter-household transfers are positive when inter-household transfer inflows are larger than 
outflows, and vice versa in the case of negative inter-household transfers. 
 
Within the NTA framework, only current transfers are included. This means that inter-
household transfers of a capital nature – bequests or dowries, for example – are excluded. 
Further, by not accounting for the value of time transfers, the value of transfers to children 
and the elderly is underestimated, as is the case for transfers from women.4 Within NTA, 
inter-household transfers involve only household heads. In other words, it is assumed that it 
is only household heads who make or receive inter-household transfers. Age-profiles are 
                                                   
4 These time transfers are often significant and may vary in response to country-specific conditions, with 
consequences for cross-country comparisons. The incorporation of time into the NTA methodology is an area of 
on-going research. Similarly, work is being done on how to account for capital transfers. 
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estimated directly from the IES 2005/06 and are aggregate-controlled using information on 
net private transfers from national accounts. 
 
While private transfers from the rest of the world are small in most countries, in some 
instances they may be substantial. These remittances may be treated in one of two ways, 
depending on whether foreign workers are considered to be residents of the sending 
country. If they are, remittances are considered to be part of the labour income of the 
household in the sending country from where the worker originates as opposed to a transfer 
from the rest of the world. In the case of South Africa, which has historically received a large 
number of migrant workers from other countries, remittances sent and received are 
considered inter-household transfers. This is due to a lack of household survey data 
pertaining to the origin or destination of remittances received or sent. 
 
In contrast “intra-household transfers are estimated indirectly as the balancing item between 
private consumption and disposable income . . . for each household member” (Mason and 
Lee, 2011a, p.72), with disposable income being labour income plus net private transfers 
plus public cash transfer inflows less taxes paid. Household members who are in deficit – 
their disposable income being less than their consumption – receive transfers from 
household members in surplus. However, in households where disposable income is 
insufficient to cover private consumption, household heads make “additional intra-household 
transfers out of asset income and, if necessary, by dissaving” (Mason and Lee, 2011a, p.72). 
Where disposable income at the household level exceeds private consumption, any surplus 
disposable income is transferred to the household head who saves it.  
 
Since the household head owns all household assets within the NTA framework, all income 
generated by those assets flows to the head. Consumption of durables – including services 
from owner-occupied housing – by household members is, therefore, ‘funded’ by a transfer 
from the household head to each member equal to the value of that member's durable 
consumption (Mason and Lee, 2011a, p.72). In most instances, however, data limitations 
mean that only owner-occupied housing is treated in this way, and this is also true for the 
South African estimates presented below. 
 
Net inter-household transfers – which is equal to net private transfers since net intra-
household transfers are, by definition, equal to zero – are estimated at R1.8 billion. Although 
there is an aggregate control for net private transfers, this is not true of its component inflows 
and outflows. NTA methodology suggests three possible ways to adjust survey estimates of 
inter-household inflows and outflows to ensure that net private transfers remain equivalent to 
the aggregate control value. First, it is possible to apply a single adjustment factor to both 
inflows and outflows that will ensure consistency with the aggregate control value. Second, 
separate adjustment factors can be applied to inflows and outflows. Third, either inflows or 
outflows (but not both) can be adjusted to ensure consistency of net transfers with the 
aggregate control value. None of these three methods is better or worse than the others per 
se and the choice of which method to use should ideally be informed by knowledge of the 
data and local conditions. A key factor here is the degree to which the household survey 
data can be trusted. In the case of the IES 2005/06, specifically, most would agree that there 
are likely to be significant problems in the collection of this type of data. Further, given the 
fact that often significant adjustments are required to reconcile results from the survey with 
those from other data sources, there is no compelling reason to trust estimates of either 
inflows or outflows to such an extent that they are accepted and the other flow is subject to 
the full adjustment. In other words, the third option does not seem appropriate. 
 
In deriving aggregate control values for inter-household transfer inflows and outflows for 
South Africa, the approach was to choose that method that resulted in the smallest 
adjustment. The first option yields an adjustment factor of -0.204, implying a massive 
adjustment in absolute terms as well as a change in directionality. This is due to the fact that 
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the aggregate control reflects a net inflow, while the survey estimates yield larger outflows 
than inflows. The second method yields far more plausible adjustment factors of 0.854 for 
outflows and 1.192 for inflows (i.e. a 14.6 percent downward adjustment of outflows and a 
19.2 percent upward adjustment of inflows), and these adjustment factors are used to 
ensure net private transfers equal R1.8 billion. 
 
Total inter-household transfer inflows are estimated at R32.8 billion, while outflows are 
estimated at R31.0 billion. These values are quite small, representing less than one-quarter 
of one percent of labour income. This small size is revealed in the necessity for a much 
larger scale in Figure 10, when compared with other flows, and the fact that at no point do 
per capita inflows or outflows exceed five percent of mean labour income amongst 30 to 49 
year olds. The figure reveals that inter-household inflows are received by adults of all ages 
and, although this is technically true for outflows, mean outflows only breach 0.5 percent of 
mean labour income amongst 30 to 49 year olds at age 22. While inter-household transfer 
inflows rise relatively gradually from the early twenties to the late fifties, outflows rise more 
rapidly and peak around age 50. 
 
Figure 10: Inter-Household Transfers, 2005 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
In combination, inter-household transfer in- and outflows result in a pattern of net inflows to 
those under the age of 28 years and to those over the age of 58 – in other words, the 
evidence indicates net flows from working age individuals to young adults and the elderly. 
Between these two ages, individuals experience net outflows that increase until the late 
forties. Peak net inflows amongst the young – just under 1.7 percent of mean labour income 
amongst 30 to 49 year olds in the early twenties – are quite similar in magnitude to those 
amongst older individuals. Thus, on average, inter-household transfers to elderly individuals 
are not very different in magnitude from those flowing to individuals between the ages of 21 
and 23 years, despite the fact that outflows tend to be larger amongst older individuals. 
 
Intra-household transfers are significantly greater than inter-household transfers, since the 
former represents the key channel through which private consumption by non-employed 
household members is likely to be financed. Indeed, intra-household transfer inflows (and 
outflows) are estimated at roughly R500 billion in 2005, equivalent to one-third of GDP. Intra-
household inflows are relatively stable across ages, ranging between 15 percent and 34 
percent of normalised labour income and between 22 percent and 34 percent for those aged 
at least 10 years (Figure 11). There are two peaks in inflows – one between ages 16 and 19 
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(with inflows equivalent to around one-third of normalised labour income), and between ages 
53 and 55 (around 32 percent of normalised labour income) – while inflows to children are 
lowest. 
 
In contrast, the variation in intra-household outflows is considerably larger. Until age 16, 
intra-household outflows are virtually unheard of and remain, for the most part, below one 
percent of normalised labour income. From around age 20, though, there is a rapid increase 
in the value of intra-household outflows such that, by age 42, per capita outflows average 
two-thirds of normalised labour income. The largest per capita outflows are generally found 
between the ages of 40 and 60 years, with a continual decline observed thereafter. This 
pattern is not inconsistent with expectations, since it is typically individuals in their forties and 
fifties who have the highest labour incomes. 
 
Figure 11: Intra-Household Transfers, 2005 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Net intra-household transfers are positive (i.e. inflows) for young people. That intra-
household transfers remain positive until the age of 28 reveals a considerable dependence 
amongst young adults, whose labour income is relatively low compared with their 
consumption, on older adults. Indeed, the age at which intra-household transfers turn from 
positive to negative (29 years) is one year younger than the age at which individuals move 
into the period of lifecycle surplus. Individuals experience increasing net intra-household 
transfer outflows until the late forties, after which it declines. This decline is relatively rapid 
until around age 70, and slows thereafter. The figure, therefore, reveals two important 
features of the South African private transfer system: first, young adults are dependent on 
intra-household transfer inflows until a relatively old age; and, second, the elderly remain 
important sources of intra-household transfers and provide support to other household 
members right through to their nineties. 
 
Given the very small size of inter-household transfers, net private transfers – as the 
combination of net inter- and intra-household transfers – is very similar to the latter. Net 
private transfers are positive until age 28, peaking at one-third of normalised labour income 
at age 17. Net private transfer outflows exist for all ages from 29 years and, at their peak, 
range between 40 percent and 47 percent of normalised labour income between the ages of 
41 and 55 years. Amongst the elderly, net private transfer outflows are slightly reduced by 
the inter-household transfer inflows they receive. 
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4.1.3 Net Transfers 
 
Net private transfers combine with net public transfers to form net transfers, the age profiles 
of which are presented in Figure 12. Net public and net private transfers follow similar 
patterns: positive at young ages, becoming negative for those in the prime working ages, 
with outflows peaking between 45 and 60 years of age and falling in size thereafter. There 
are, though, some important differences between the two sets of transfers. Net public 
transfers are generally smaller in magnitude than net private transfers, the only real 
exceptions being for those up to the age of 10 years and those in their late twenties. Further, 
although net public transfers turn from outflows to inflows amongst the elderly, net private 
transfers remain negative, indicating continued support of household members by the 
elderly. 
 
Figure 12: Net Transfers, 2005 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The age profile of net transfers, therefore, follows a broadly similar pattern to that of public 
and private transfers. Net transfer inflows rise from around 25 percent of normalised labour 
income at age zero to a peak of 50 percent at age 17. Thereafter, however, net transfer 
inflows decline rapidly, falling by more than five percent of normalised labour income per 
year of age until the age of 39 years. Transfers turn negative by the age of 27, with outflows 
largest amongst those between the ages of 48 and 50 years, during which time they are in 
excess of 75 percent of normalised labour income per capita. From age 56, however, per 
capita outflows decline rapidly, falling below 30 percent of normalised labour income by age 
65. For those over the age of 65, there is a gradual decline in the magnitude of net transfer 
outflows, which eventually become net inflows from age 86 as net public transfer inflows 
continue to rise. 
 
4.2 Asset-Based Reallocations 
 
Asset-based reallocations are financial flows that arise from asset-related transactions, 
whether in the public or private sectors. The two main types of flows are asset income, 
consisting of capital income and property income, and saving. Capital income includes net 
operating surplus and capital's share of mixed income. Property income, as defined in 
national accounts, consists of “interest (income and expense), distributed income of 
corporations, reinvested earnings on direct foreign investment, property income attributed to 
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insurance policyholders, and rent (i.e. the return to land and subsoil assets)” (Mason and 
Lee, 2011a, p.70). 
 
It should be noted that asset income is notoriously difficult to capture and there is significant 
under-reporting of asset income in the IES 2005/06. Total income from capital and property 
(asset income) captured in the IES 2005/06 is estimated at just R10.7 billion, compared with 
R244.8 billion as recorded in the national accounts (Statistics South Africa, 2008c, p.12). 
Unless this under-capturing is random across age, the resulting age profiles generated here 
will be distorted. Unfortunately, though, there is no readily available alternative data source 
with which to corroborate, supplement or replace the IES data. 
 
Public asset-based reallocations refer to the inflows and outflows that result from 
transactions relating to public assets and can be categorised into two types of flows: public 
asset income and public saving (Mason and Lee, 2011a, p.69). If public asset income is 
positive, it represents an inflow to taxpayers, while positive public savings represent outflows 
from taxpayers. Mathematically, public asset-based reallocations are calculated as public 
asset income less public saving. Flows relating to public assets are allocated to across age 
groups using general tax age profiles. This means that the profiles of earmarked taxes are 
ignored. As Mason and Lee (2011a, p.70) note, this approach is motivated on the basis of a 
counterfactual: “[in] the absence of public asset income or public borrowing, general tax 
revenues would have been greater (given public spending) . . . [and therefore] the asset-
based inflow is allocated to age groups in proportion to the general taxes they pay”. 
 
Age profiles of net public asset income, net public saving and net public asset-based 
reallocations are presented in Figure 13. Due to public sector dissaving in 2005, the net 
public saving age profile lies below the horizontal axis. However, on a per capita basis this 
dissaving is very small and rarely exceeds 0.7 percent of normalised labour income. Since 
saving is distributed across age using the general tax profile, the largest per capita flows are 
observed for those in their mid-fifties. Net public asset income was more strongly negative, 
but still small relative to other flows. Net public asset income outflows only breached three 
percent of normalised labour income at age 31 and peak at just under 5.8 percent in the mid-
fifties. Thereafter, it declines again to below four percent of normalised labour income by age 
81. Net public asset-based reallocations follow a very similar pattern to net public asset 
income, although it peaked roughly 15 percent lower than the latter due to the effect of public 
dissaving. 
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Figure 13: Public Asset-Based Reallocations, 2005 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Private asset income consists of capital income and property income. Private capital income 
represents the return to private capital (i.e. held by corporations and households) and 
consists of corporations' and households' operating surplus and the portion of mixed income 
attributable to capital (Mason and Lee, 2011a, p.74). Flows generated by financial assets 
comprise property income, with interest, dividends and rent (for land or minerals) being 
some of the major examples.  
 
The age profile of private asset income is derived through a process of aggregating the age 
profiles of its components, since each component may have a different age profile. In line 
with NTA methodology, the aggregate amounts were allocated across age groups using the 
following age profiles: 
• Net operating surplus of households: age profile of imputed rent; 
• Capital's share of net mixed income: age profile of self-employment earnings; 
• Net operating surplus of corporations and NPISHs: age profile of property income; 
• Indirect taxes less subsidies: age profile of property income; 
• Interest outflows of households: age profile of interest expense; 
• Other private interest outflows: age profile of property income; 
• Other property income outflows: age profile of property income; and 
• Property income inflows: age profile of property income. 
 
Aggregated, these various age profiles yield the net private asset income age profile 
presented in Figure 14. It is evident that asset income is substantial at certain ages. While 
net private asset income is very low until the early twenties, only breaching three percent of 
normalised labour income at age 24, it rises consistently to breach 90 percent of normalised 
labour income by age 58. It remains above that level until age 76, after which it declines.  
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Figure 14: Private Asset-Based Reallocations, 2005 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Private saving is calculated as a residual in order that the accounts balance, in the same 
way that it is a balancing item in national accounts (Mason and Lee, 2011a, p.75). Private 
saving inflows can be generated by going into debt or by selling assets, while the repayment 
of debt or acquisition of assets results in private saving outflows. In terms of the NTA 
methodology, private saving is calculated at each age, using the NTA identity, as the 
lifecycle deficit less net transfers less net public asset-based reallocations less net private 
asset income. The age profile for net private saving shows some instability at young ages, 
although it tends to be negative (dissaving) until the age of 32 years. Thereafter, net private 
saving tends to be positive and peaks above 25 percent of normalised labour income 
between the ages of 54 and 61 years. While net savings declines relatively quickly until the 
mid-sixties, it remains positive and between ten percent and 18 percent of normalised labour 
income until the mid-eighties. 
 
4.3 Financing the Deficit at Different Ages 
 
Transfers and asset-based reallocations are the means through which lifecycle deficits are 
financed.  Amongst children and young adults, the lifecycle deficit is financed almost 
exclusively through net transfer inflows from the state, other households and from within 
their own house-holds (Figure 15). Asset-based reallocations play a very small role, 
particularly for those children not yet in their mid-teens. From the mid- to late-twenties, 
asset-based reallocations surpass transfer inflows in importance, and net transfers quickly 
turn negative. For adults and the elderly, asset-based reallocations are positive, while net 
transfers are negative and it is only the magnitudes of these two flows that vary. 
 
  
Maximising South Africa's Demographic Dividend 
 
25 
 
Figure 15: Financing of the Lifecycle Deficit, 2005 
 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 2 provides more detail on the financing of the lifecycle deficit and quantifies the Rand 
values of the aggregate NTA flows. The lifecycle deficit is estimated at R336.4 billion in 2005 
for the population as a whole. The deficit is almost entirely financed through asset-based 
real-locations, estimated at R352.0 billion, with there being a slight net transfer outflow (to 
the rest of the world) of R15.7 billion. On their own, cohorts aged zero through 19 years 
account for the full lifecycle deficit, with deficits balancing surpluses in the rest of the 
population. Roughly three-fifths (60.8 percent) of labour income is earned by individuals 
aged 30 to 49 years, with just under 22 percent earned by 50 to 64 year olds and 16.2 
percent earned by 20 to 29 year olds. As a result, a lifecycle surplus of R110.6 billion is 
generated by the 30 to 49 year cohort. 
 
Although asset-based reallocation on their own essentially finance the entire aggregate 
lifecycle deficit, there are significant differences across the five cohorts presented in the 
table. For the youngest cohort, net transfer inflows finance 98 percent of the lifecycle deficit. 
Of the R331.6 net transfer inflows, private transfers account for around 57 percent. Amongst 
20 to 29 year olds, asset-based reallocations are somewhat more important and represent 
30 percent of the lifecycle deficit. Net public transfers are negligible for this cohort, 
accounting for less than five percent of net transfers. Asset-based reallocations, though, 
really take on importance for the oldest three cohorts as private asset-based reallocations 
rise dramatically. Total asset-based reallocations for 30 to 49 year olds are, in absolute 
terms, almost equivalent to the net private transfer outflow, while for 50 to 64 year olds they 
exceed the net private transfer outflow by roughly 50 percent. For the latter cohort, asset-
based reallocations almost balance net transfers, resulting in a small lifecycle surplus of 
R17.3 billion. 
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Table 2: Financing the Lifecycle Deficit, 2005 (R billions) 
 
Component Total 0-19 
years 
20-29 
years 
30-49 
years 
50-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Lifecycle Deficit 336.4 338.2 80.0 -110.6 -17.3 46.0 
…Consumption 1126.5 342.2 207.9 369.7 154.3 52.5 
…Less: Labour Income 790.1 3.9 127.9 480.3 171.6 6.5 
Transfers -15.7 331.6 56.1 -266.8 -123.7 -12.9 
…Public Transfers -17.5 141.9 2.7 -108.8 -52.7 -0.5 
……Inflows 376.2 177.7 55.9 74.1 40.7 27.8 
……Outflows -393.6 -35.9 -53.2 -182.9 -93.4 -28.2 
…Private Transfers 1.8 189.7 53.4 -158.0 -71.0 -12.4 
……Inter-Household Transfers 1.8 1.2 3.6 -4.2 -0.3 1.5 
……Intra-Household Transfers 0.0 188.5 49.8 -153.7 -70.7 -13.9 
Asset-Based Reallocations (ABR) 352.0 6.7 23.9 156.2 106.4 58.8 
…Private ABR 391.0 10.3 29.2 174.2 115.7 61.7 
……Private Asset Income 436.5 1.5 15.2 183.7 163.3 72.8 
……Private Saving -45.6 8.8 13.9 -9.5 -47.7 -11.1 
…Public ABR -38.9 -3.6 -5.2 -18.0 -9.3 -2.8 
……Public Asset Income -44.7 -4.1 -6.0 -20.7 -10.6 -3.2 
……Public Saving 5.8 0.5 0.8 2.7 1.4 0.4 
 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Notes: Savings are negative values in the table since saving represents an outflow from a particular individual. 
Conversely, dissaving is positive (i.e. an inflow). 
 
The data presented in Table 2 can be expressed slightly differently, with a focus on the 
financing of consumption as opposed to the lifecycle deficit. In Table 3, the contributions of 
labour income, transfers and asset-based reallocations to the financing of consumption are 
presented for the five cohorts. In aggregate, labour income and asset-based reallocations 
are equivalent to 70.1 percent and 31.3 percent respectively of consumption, with net 
transfer outflows equivalent to 1.4 percent of consumption.  
 
The table again illustrates the shift in importance from transfers, to labour income, to asset-
based reallocations as cohorts age. Transfers are key to financing consumption amongst the 
youngest members of society. Amongst those under the age of 20 years, transfers account 
for 96.9 percent of consumption and they remain important for 20 to 29 year olds (27.0 
percent of consumption) despite the fact that individuals in this age group are earning a 
significant amount of labour income. Labour income's importance is greatest amongst those 
between 30 and 64, representing 129.9 percent of consumption amongst 30 to 49 year olds 
and 111.2 percent amongst 50 to 64 year olds. Finally, asset-based reallocations assume 
increasing importance as age increases, accounting for 42.2 percent of consumption 
amongst 30 to 49 year olds, rising to 112.1 percent of consumption amongst individuals 
aged 65 years or more. 
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Table 3: Financing Consumption, 2005 (percent) 
 
Age Group Labour 
Income 
Transfers Public 
Transfers 
Private 
Transfers 
Asset-Based 
Reallocations 
0 to 19 years 1.1 96.9 41.5 55.4 1.9 
20 to 29 years 61.5 27 1.3 25.7 11.5 
30 to 49 years 129.9 -72.2 -29.4 -42.7 42.2 
50 to 64 years 111.2 -80.2 -34.2 -46 69 
65+ years 12.4 -24.6 -0.9 -23.7 112.1 
Total 70.1 -1.4 -1.6 0.2 31.3 
 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Notes: Shares may not add up to 100 in rows due to rounding. 
 
For all cohorts, public and private transfers operate in the same direction and public 
transfers are smaller than private transfers. For the two youngest cohorts, net public and net 
private transfers are positive, while for the oldest three cohorts they are negative. The 
difference between net public and net private transfers is greatest for the cohorts aged 20 to 
29 years and those aged 65 years or more. For the former, rising labour income and 
declining involvement in education result in a rapid fall in public transfers to just 1.3 percent 
of consumption, while private transfers decline less rapidly. For those aged 65 years or 
more, lowered labour income puts downward pressure on public transfer outflows, with this 
cohort also receiving greater public transfer inflows in the form of public health consumption 
and social security (the old age pension).  
 
Families and other social networks are, therefore, key to financing consumption (or the 
lifecycle deficit) over the lifecycle. Indeed, for cohorts with net transfer inflows, private 
transfer inflows are significantly greater than those from the public sector. Although this is 
not surprising – households are by far the most significant institution through which the 
needs of children are met – it is interesting that young adults (20 to 29 years) experience 
both almost neutral public transfers in aggregate, and significant private transfers. This may 
be related to the fact that labour income accounts for a relatively small proportion of 
consumption for young adults, due in large part to the high rates of unemployment 
experienced by this age group. Using a simple average of per capita labour income and per 
capita consumption for the individual age cohorts between the ages of 20 and 29 years, 
South Africa has the third lowest ratio of labour income to consumption of the countries for 
which there is data (63.1 percent). Only Nigeria (38.0 percent) and Senegal (58.9 percent) 
have lower ratios, while Mexico (65.7 percent) and Brazil (72.3 percent) are the next closest 
countries to South Africa. 
 
5. MAXIMISING SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDENDS 
 
5.1 South Africa's Demographic Dividends 
 
The demographic transition – from an equilibrium characterised by high fertility and high 
mortality, to one characterised by low fertility and low mortality – has important economic 
consequences. In the initial stages of the demographic transition, mortality falls first, 
particularly amongst children. This results in a ‘boom’ generation and a surge in the 
population growth rate as parents take time to adjust their fertility decisions and populations 
become younger on average. However, once parents adjust their fertility decisions, fertility 
falls and the population growth rate declines again. 
 
The early stages of the transition sees an increase in the number of dependent children and, 
therefore, a rise in the child dependency ratio (the ratio of dependent children to working-age 
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adults). During this time, working-age adults face increased demands on the resources that 
they are able to generate through their labour. Over time, however, as these large cohorts of 
children enter the working ages and fertility begins to decline, the working-age population 
grows as a proportion of the total population. This begins to free up resources, allowing for 
greater investment in human, physical and financial capital. The final stage of this transition 
includes a surge in the size of the elderly population as large cohorts reach retirement age, 
forcing up the old-age dependency ratio. Ideally, by this stage, a sustainable way of 
financing the consumption of the elderly – for example, individual retirement savings – has 
been established. 
 
The demographic transition can boost economic growth in two key ways. The first boost to 
economic growth occurs as the dependency ratio begins to fall as fertility declines and the 
working-age population grows as a share of the total population. The decline in the average 
number of children per working-age adult is associated with a freeing up of resources that 
would previously have been consumed by additional children, allowing living standards to 
rise. As Bloom et al. (2003, p.xi) put it, “if most of a nation's population falls within the 
working ages, the added productivity of this group can produce a ‘demographic dividend’ of 
economic growth, assuming that policies to take advantage of this are in place”. This is the 
first demographic dividend. 
 
The second way in which economic growth may be boosted by the demographic transition – 
the second demographic dividend – is associated with the phase of population ageing. 
Rising life expectancy results in increased demand for wealth: working-age cohorts 
increasingly accumulate wealth to support themselves during old age, a process facilitated 
by lowered fertility. At the same time, with fewer children, working-age cohorts are able to 
invest more in the education and health of their offspring. This accumulation of financial and 
human capital, through capital deepening and higher incomes, may permanently boost 
economic growth.  
 
One of the important summary measures in NTA is the support ratio, defined as the ratio of 
total labour income to total consumption for a given year. The support ratio (SR) is 
calculated as: 
SRt = Σa yl(a, t0) N(a, t)  
Σa c(a, t0) N(a, t)    (2) 
 
where yl (a, t) and c(a, t0) are respectively the per capita labour income and consumption 
age profiles in base year t0, and N(a, t) is historical or projected population data. In other 
words, the support ratio weights alternative age structures using the labour income and 
consumption age profiles, and represents the ratio of effective producers to effective 
consumers. The greater the support ratio, the higher total labour income is to total 
consumption, or the higher the number of effective producers is to effective consumers. By 
measuring the rate of change of the support ratio over time, it is possible to quantify the first 
demographic dividend.  
 
There is one key assumption that is made when calculating the support ratio and first 
demographic dividend and it has important implications for our understanding of the two 
measures. The support ratio is calculated by projecting the labour income and consumption 
age profiles from a single point in time. In other words, the support ratio and first 
demographic dividend are estimated based on the assumption that the patterns of labour 
income and consumption observed at that point in time are ‘typical’ and unchanging over 
time. This means, in the context of labour income for example, that the structure of 
remuneration in an economy does not change systematically over the period, that labour 
force participation rates by age do not change and that unemployment rates do not change. 
From the perspective of consumption, it assumes constant consumption patterns insofar as 
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they affect our estimates of consumption, but also that the institutional context does not 
change over time. These are rather strong assumptions, but they can be mediated, in time, 
by including new estimates of labour income and consumption age profiles from other years. 
 
In Figure 16, estimates of the size of South Africa's first demographic dividend are presented 
based on the estimated labour income and consumption age profiles for 2005. The projected 
trajectories of the first dividend until 2060 under three fertility assumptions – low, medium 
and high fertility – is also presented. South Africa is projected to experience a period of 
roughly 75 years during which demographic change will be favourable to economic growth. 
This first demographic dividend is estimated to have begun during the mid-1970s and is 
expected to continue until at least the mid-2040s. The dividend is, however, not constant 
over the period, the result of demographic idiosyncrasies not least of which is the impact of 
HIV/Aids. During the first roughly three decades of the first demographic dividend, the boost 
to economic growth rises rapidly, peaking around 0.9 percentage points in the early 1990s. 
However, it does not remain at the level long, initially falling rapidly and then more slowly. 
Based on the medium fertility assumption, the size of the first dividend will continue to 
decline until the early part of the 2020s, at which point it will again increase to just under 0.4 
percentage points in the following decade. 
 
Figure 16: Estimates of South Africa's First Demographic Dividend, 1950-2060 
 
Source:  Own calculations. 
 
This late surge in the size of the first dividend is associated with the impact of HIV/Aids, 
which has severely impacted South Africa. The rapid spread of the disease in South Africa 
means that the country has the third highest prevalence of HIV in the world (11 087 per 
100 000 in 2011) and the largest population living with HIV (5.6 million in 2011), and has 
seen life expectancy lowered by five years to 58 years between 1990 and 2011 (World 
Health Organization, 2013). The spread of HIV/Aids has primarily been amongst cohorts of 
working age and evidence points to particularly high prevalence rates amongst women 
between the ages of 20 and 40 years, and men between 30 and 44 years (although 
prevalence rates are generally lower amongst men). The result is a reduction in the size of 
the working age cohorts – adults aged 20 to 49 years accounted for 50 percent of all deaths 
in Southern Africa during the 2005-2010 period, compared with 21 percent in 1985-1990 
(UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2011, p.20) – a rise in 
the dependency ratio and a decline in the support ratio as the number of effective earners 
declines faster than the number of effective consumers. At the same time, population growth 
slowed with downward pressure on the number of women of childbearing age within the 
population, as well as increased infant and child mortality related to mother-to-child 
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transmission of HIV. Mother-to-child transmission of HIV has, though, been significantly 
reduced through interventions including the provision of free anti-retrovirals by the state. The 
effect of the pandemic, then, is to depress the support ratio by reducing the size of the 
working-age population but then, later, to boost the support ratio by slowing the growth of the 
elderly population as the cohorts most affected by the pandemic reach old age.  
 
The importance of declining fertility in generating the demographic dividend is also evident in 
Figure 16. The low and high fertility assumptions differ by 0.5 children respectively below 
and above the baseline medium fertility assumption. More rapid fertility decline is associated 
with a larger first dividend that ends slightly sooner than that under the medium fertility 
assumption, while slower fertility decline reduces the dividend significantly. 
 
5.2 Maximising the Dividends 
 
Under the medium fertility assumption, South Africa is currently almost exactly halfway 
through the period of positive first demographic dividend, estimated to have started in the 
mid-1970s. Further, apart from an expected surge in the size of the dividend in the early 
2030s, the size of the dividend over the next 30-odd years is likely to be smaller than it is 
currently, which itself is less than half the peak in the early 1990s. In other words, unlike 
most other African countries, the policy question in South Africa is not what should be done 
to maximise a coming, future dividend; instead, the question in South Africa is what can be 
done within a relatively short timescale to boost the size of the dividend in its final three 
decades. Perhaps more importantly, what should be done now to ensure that South African 
society is able to benefit from the second dividend as its population begins to age. 
 
In order to answer this question, the channels through which the demographic dividends are 
generated need to be identified and, in particular, those channels that have relatively short 
lags. From a non-NTA perspective, Bloom et al. (2003, p.39) identify labour supply, savings 
and human capital as the most important channels through which the demographic dividend 
is realised. In terms of policy that aims to maximise the demographic dividend, these are 
broadened and discussed below as policies that operate through the labour market, through 
economic policy and through social policy. 
 
5.2.1 Through the Labour Market  
 
The performance of the labour market is central to the understanding and interpretation of 
the first demographic dividend. The estimation of the dividend assumes that the patterns of 
labour income and consumption remain constant over the period under investigation. Since 
the labour income profile is the outcome of the interaction between age-specific employment 
rates and patterns of mean remuneration levels, the extent to which the first demographic 
dividend is realised depends on future labour market performance. Any deterioration in 
labour market conditions relative to those in the base year would reduce the actual size of 
the first demographic dividend. Conversely, any improvement within the labour market could 
potentially boost the dividend. 
 
The South African labour market remains distorted by the effects of apartheid, two decades 
after the advent of democracy. Inequalities in the provision of education by race group – in 
both quality and quantity terms – has resulted in a skewed distribution of skills in favour of 
the White, and to a lesser extent, Asian minorities. At the same time, the growth path 
followed by the economy for much of the past four decades has been capital- and skills-
intensive. As a result, demand for less-skilled workers has declined, while high-skilled 
workers remain scarce. This mismatch between labour supply and demand is most starkly 
illustrated in unemployment rates by educational attainment: in 2013, the expanded 
unemployment rate, which includes both the searching and the non-searching unemployed, 
for those with only an incomplete secondary education is seven times that of those with 
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university degrees (42.5 percent as opposed to 6.0 percent) (own calculations, Statistics 
South Africa, 2013). 
 
The skills mismatch exists alongside significant youth unemployment, with unemployment 
amongst 15 to 24 year olds estimated at 63.4 percent in 2013, and 37.4 percent amongst 25 
to 34 year olds. High rates of unemployment amongst younger cohorts was offered as an 
explanation for the late rise in labour income in South Africa and the late transition to 
surplus. An extended period of economic dependence amongst young people is an 
immediate concern in terms of the additional burden placed on older cohorts, directly as the 
source of private transfers and indirectly as the ultimate source of public transfers. It also 
represents a longer-term concern through the ‘wage scar’ that youth unemployment may 
cause. Although no estimates of a youth unemployment wage scar exist for South Africa, 
Gregg and Tominey (2004, p.2), for example, find that youth unemployment imposes a wage 
scar of around 12 percent to 15 percent at age 42 in Great Britain, although it is lower if 
repeat unemployment spells are avoided. Youth unemployment, therefore, negatively 
impacts future earnings potential, constraining the ability of prime working cohorts to 
generate sufficient future surpluses and limiting the scope for saving and making transfers to 
other cohorts. 
 
Bloom et al. (2003, p.39) argue that labour supply is one of the channels through which the 
demographic dividend is realised, noting that the demographic transition increases the 
supply of labour through the entry of larger cohorts into the labour force and through 
increased participation amongst women. The South African experience is consistent with 
this. Since the 1970s, the working-age population has been growing more rapidly than the 
total population, the difference being the largest during the early 1990s. However, it was only 
after the removal of apartheid restrictions on the labour market and on the ability of all South 
Africans to move freely within the country's borders that the full effect of the female labour 
supply response became evident, to the extent that one of the defining features of the South 
African labour market during the first decade of democracy has been the feminisation of the 
labour force (Casale and Posel, 2002). Unfortunately, however, rapid growth in the labour 
force was not consistently met by similar growth in employment. At the same time it should 
be noted that labour force participation rates in South Africa are not particularly high – 
around 61.5 percent including the non-searching unemployed – and there exists scope for 
further significant increases in labour supply in the future. 
 
The labour market is a critical area in terms of government policy in South Africa, particularly 
given its  centrality to the poverty and inequality challenges the country faces, and it is widely 
recognised that the  economy's current growth trajectory must change if unemployment is to 
be addressed. Specifically, the consensus is that it is critical that the economy follow a more 
labour-intensive and a more unskilled-labour intensive growth path. In other words, the 
economy should grow in a way that is consistent with our large supply of relatively unskilled 
labour.  
 
Various objectives contained within South Africa's National Development Plan (NDP) 
(National Planning Commission, 2011) relate to the ideas of increased labour supply and 
higher levels of employment, both of which are consistent with realising the demographic 
dividends. Indeed, the NDP notes that South Africa is currently in that stage of the 
demographic transition when the demographic dividend is available, but notes that this is 
constrained by “the challenges of HIV/AIDS and joblessness [that] are a burden on those 
who are working” (National Planning Commission, 2011, p.78). The plan envisages, for 
example, a decline in the unemployment rate from 25 percent in 2012 to six percent in 2030, 
rising employment rates in both urban and rural areas, an 11 percentage point increase in 
labour force participation to 65 percent in 2030, and an expansion of public employment 
programmes to reach one million people by 2015 and two million by 2030. Similarly, the New 
Growth Path, developed by the Department of Economic Development, aims to create five 
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million jobs in the decade up till 2020 (EDD, 2011). One of the channels through which it 
aims to achieve this is by promoting more labour-intensive activities, particularly in the 
agricultural and mining value chains, manufacturing and services. Significant progress 
towards these objectives would certainly improve the country's ability to capture the 
demographic dividend. 
 
Importantly, though, policy in this area must have a particular focus on young people, who 
are suffering the brunt of unemployment. Not only must the economy grow in such a way as 
to increase the total number of jobs, but the ability of young people to access these jobs 
needs to be enhanced. This might occur through a variety of interventions relating to 
education, the development of soft skills, practical training and work experience, and 
addressing spatial dislocations and public transport, amongst others. Importantly, the 
movement of young people from the education system into the world of work requires 
facilitation, particularly given the fact that there are substantial numbers that exit the 
schooling system prior to completing secondary education and the economy is simply not 
geared towards providing large-scale employment opportunities at this, or even completed 
secondary, level. 
 
5.2.2 Through economic policy 
 
Economic policy is obviously a very broad area of policy, including monetary and fiscal 
policy, trade and industrial policy, and infrastructural policy, amongst others. The key focus 
on economic policy hinges on its links to the labour market. Economic policy should drive 
growth, seeking to resolve the binding constraints that limit South Africa's growth potential. 
Although since overtaken by more recent policy frameworks, the Accelerated and Shared 
Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) identified six binding constraints on economic 
growth that remain pertinent, namely: volatility and level of the currency; the cost, efficiency 
and capacity of the national logistics system; shortages of suitably skilled labour, amplified 
by the impact of apartheid spatial patterns on the cost of labour; barriers to entry, limits to 
competition and limited new investment opportunities; regulatory environment and the 
burden on small and medium businesses; and deficiencies in state organisation, capacity 
and leadership (Republic of South Africa, 2006, pp.4-5). 
 
One of the major new policy directions – with very direct links to national transfer accounts – 
is the future introduction of mandated savings for all working individuals, while the state 
provides measures that make pensions safe and sustainable. By ensuring that the employed 
save for retirement, the state can reduce future reliance on the state old age pension 
system, while also potentially relieving pressure on households by reducing the need for 
private transfers to finance the consumption of the elderly. South Africans are notoriously 
bad ‘savers’ – the gross savings rate has averaged 15 percent of GDP between 2003 and 
2012 (own calculations, South African Reserve Bank, 2013) – and, in the absence of 
mandatory retirement savings, voluntary savings are vulnerable as workers change jobs and 
access their retirement savings. Mandatory retirement savings should certainly boost the 
overall level of savings in the economy, with a positive impact on the size of the second 
demographic dividend. 
 
However, once again, employment is central to the achievement of this objective. Without 
jobs today, working-age cohorts are unable to save for tomorrow, while wage scarring in 
response to episodes of youth unemployment will have a long term impact on the amount 
that can be saved. More broadly though, government should promote an environment that 
encourages saving, through economic policy as well as by attempting to shift societal norms 
to place greater importance on saving as opposed to the ‘conspicuous consumption’ that has 
proliferated since the end of apartheid. 
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5.2.3 Through social policy 
 
Education, health and social welfare are three facets of social policy that may potentially be 
employed to better reap the potential benefits presented by the demographic dividend. A 
fourth area with particular relevance in the South African is the provision of assets in the 
form of formal housing, connections to water and electricity networks, sanitation, refuse 
removal and other such services. 
 
In the arena of social service provision, South Africa has long been characterised by a 
fractured delivery system. Under apartheid, separate government departments delivered 
education and health services depending on race and location. Thus, for example, by the 
early 1990s, there were 14 government departments responsible for education in South 
Africa. While these departments were incorporated into single national departments post-
1994, there is still some degree of fracturing in that provincial governments are responsible 
for social service delivery in (non-university) education and health.  
 
One of the central problems affecting education and health is the uneven standard of service 
delivery, with wide variation in quality and performance across provinces. Just as important, 
though, is the fact that provinces face widely varying initial conditions, with some provinces 
particularly burdened by the dysfunctional departments inherited from the previous political 
system and, at the same time, often having to provide services to some of the country's 
poorest, most deprived and least urbanised areas. One of the responses has been to 
provide more funding per capita in poorer areas. In terms of education, for example, state 
subsidies per pupil are calculated using a sliding scale with schools in the most deprived 
areas (based on Census data) receiving the largest per capita subsidy. 
 
The process of equalisation of spending across race groups – or, rather, the delinking of per 
capita spending levels from race – has often fuelled perceptions of falling quality in the public 
health and education systems. Those who can afford to move to private sector provision of 
healthcare, in particular, have tended to do so. The private healthcare system in South Africa 
is well-resourced, but covers only a fraction of the country's population. It is estimated that 
approximately 17 percent of South Africans are covered by private medical schemes, while 
almost 30 percent of South Africans report using private healthcare services at the time of 
their last visit (Blecher et al., 2011, p.32). At the same time, Blecher et al. (2011, p.33) 
estimate that, at the time, private financing accounted for roughly half of total health 
spending since the 2008/09 fiscal year. 
 
The South African social security system is relatively well developed compared to other 
African countries and developing countries in general. The system is consists primarily of 
social welfare programmes, rather than social insurance, and has been expanded 
significantly over the past two decades. The social grants system is extensive, with 16.1 
million grant beneficiaries in March 2013 and is focussed on alleviating poverty amongst 
children and the elderly. The largest grants in terms of the number beneficiaries are the child 
support grant (CSG), with 11.3 million beneficiaries in March 2013, the old age pension 
(OAP), with 2.9 million beneficiaries, and the disability grant, with just under 1.2 million 
beneficiaries (SASSA, 2013). These three grants account for 95.5 percent of all grants paid 
by the state.5  
 
The extent of the system, high access rates amongst the targeted populations and the 
relatively high value of particularly the old age pension means that the system is able to 
                                                   
5 The system has expanded rapidly since the mid-1990s and continues to be extended. Since the 2005/06 
financial year, the total number of beneficiaries has increased by nearly 50 percent from 10.9 million, driven 
primarily by the CSG (+4.3 million) and, to a lesser extent, by the OAP (+0.7 million) (own calculations, National 
Treasury, 2009; SASSA, 2013). 
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make a significant impact on poverty. For example, based on data from the 2008/2009 Living 
Conditions Survey, it is estimated that the old age pension alone reduced the poverty 
headcount ratio by four percentage points, as well as lowering the poverty gap and squared 
poverty gap measures (own calculations, Statistics South Africa, 2012b). 
 
Since the mid-1990s, significant resources and effort have been targeted at improving living 
conditions amongst the poor. The removal of restrictions on geographic mobility within South 
Africa and the opening up of urban job markets resulted in a significant urbanisation trend. 
Local governments have typically been unprepared for the extent of population growth in 
urban areas and, as a result, informal settlements – referred to in other countries as shanty 
towns – are a common feature of the local urban landscape. Government policy has, 
therefore, focussed on the provision of low-cost housing, the connection of households to 
the electricity grid, the provision of clean water and sanitation, amongst other things. While 
significant challenges remain, important strides have been made. For example, it is 
estimated that 77.6 percent of South African households reside in formal dwellings in 2011 
(58.1 percent in 1996), 91.2 percent have access to piped water (80.5 percent in 1996), 94.8 
percent have access to a toilet facility (87.6 percent in 1996), while 84.7 percent have 
access to electricity for lighting (58.2 percent in 1996) (Statistics South Africa, 2005, 2012a). 
All of these improvements are either direct investments in human capital, or improve the 
effectiveness of other human capital investments. 
 
A key policy area in thinking about the demographic dividend is certainly education, since it 
is argued that the decline in fertility that occurs during the demographic transition allows for 
greater human capital investment. Education continues to be a vexing policy challenge in 
South Africa. At six percent of GDP, public spending on education is high by international 
standards (World Bank, 2012). However, significant inequalities within the system persist, 
with the result that quality is uneven across schools. Van der Berg (2007, p.859) estimates 
that while Africans accounted for 83 percent of the Grade 12 cohort in 2003, they accounted 
for only 71 percent of passes, 22 percent of higher grade mathematics passes (with a 50 
percent mark or better), and just eight percent of passes with an A-aggregate mark (average 
over all subjects of at least 80 percent). Such inequalities in education reproduce inequality 
in the labour market and raising quality in former black schools, therefore, must be a priority 
for policy. 
 
Most worrying is the fact that “South African schools generally perform at an even lower level 
than most of their African counterparts, despite greater South African resources, less acute 
poverty and more educated parents” (Van der Berg, 2007, p.854). Again, this demonstrates 
some of the inequalities within the system, but also points to systemic failures within 
education that do not bode well in an era of globalisation, international trade and competition 
for foreign direct investment. While finance is an important constraint, it would appear that 
there are other real resource constraints that limit the country's ability to provide quality 
education to all. As noted 20 years ago, “[competent] teachers, nurses, doctors and 
community workers are scarce, as is the capacity to produce books, medical supplies, and 
building materials” (Donaldson (1992:p.147), as quoted in Van der Berg, 2007, p.872). 
 
South Africa faces numerous health challenges, not least of which is the HIV/Aids pandemic. 
After some initial inaction, the South African government rolled out free anti-retrovirals 
across the country. This has done much to halt mother-to-child transmission of the disease, 
as well as extending the productive lives of adults living with the disease. At the same time, 
tuberculosis is a significant health problem that is compounded by HIV prevalence, as well 
as overcrowding and inadequate housing and sanitation. Tuberculosis is the leading cause 
of years of life lost in South Africa (17.3 percent of total years of life lost in 2009), followed by 
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lower respiratory infection (12.1 percent), HIV/Aids (10.3 percent) and diarrhoeal disease 
(8.7 percent) (Day and Gray, 2013, p.218).6 
 
The National Development Plan has numerous objectives relating to education and health. 
In education, it emphasises that early childhood development should be a top priority and 
that children should have at least two years' preschool education (as opposed to no 
requirement currently); that there should be an improvement in throughput in the secondary 
education system; that the (non-university) college system should be expanded so that a 25 
percent participation rate can be achieved; that 30 000 artisans be produced annually by 
2030; that university enrolments should increase by 70 percent to 1.62 million; and that the 
number of student in mathematics- and science-based degrees should rise to 450 000 
(National Planning Commission, 2011). In the area of health, some of the stated goals 
include raising life expectancy to 70 years; the improvement of tuberculosis prevention and 
cure; the reduction of maternal, infant and child mortality; and halving the rates of injury, 
accidents and violence. The state is also in the early stages of implementing a national 
health insurance programme, broadly along the lines of the UK system. It is hoped that this 
will facilitate the improvement of health services in the public sector, thereby reducing 
inequalities in access that currently exist.  
 
There is growing consensus that South Africa cannot afford to expand the social grant 
system much beyond its current scale. The number of grant recipients now outnumbers the 
number of employed individuals and is roughly three times the number of individual 
taxpayers in the country. While there is enthusiasm in certain circles to introduce 
conditionalities, related to human capital investment in particular, it is not clear that such 
policies would yield sufficient benefits to justify the additional cost and administrative 
complexity. School enrolment rates are high and significant strides have already been made 
in terms of child health, for example. New types of grants have been suggested, including a 
“workseekers’ grant” that aims to facilitate job search. Leveraging grants to facilitate human 
capital investment or economic activity may be a useful avenue to pursue for future policy. 
There is, though, an important hole in the social safety net: there is absolutely no access to 
social welfare for the able-bodied, working-age population who have not been employed in 
the formal sector. Unemployment insurance can only be accessed by those who have 
worked in the formal sector. Given South Africa's high rate of unemployment and high 
proportion of people who have never worked before, this means that the majority of the 
unemployed are excluded from the system. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The National Transfer Accounts methodology provides a new way of investigating the 
resource flows across age cohorts that occur as individuals work, consume, share and save. 
Apart from enabling the analysis of these flows, the methodology allows us to better 
understand the ways in which economies might need to adapt and change in response to 
population aging over time. The results presented in this paper represent the first full set of 
national transfer accounts for South Africa and has yielded several interesting results. 
 
The estimates reveal that South Africans under the age of 30 and those over the age of 59 
consume more than they earn in the labour market, i.e. they have lifecycle deficits. That the 
very young and the very old should have lifecycle deficits is not unexpected, given legislative 
and societal norms restricting their involvement in the labour market. In order to finance 
these deficits, however, the young and the old rely on two very different flows. The deficit 
amongst young people is financed almost exclusively through transfers, public and private, 
                                                   
6 It should be noted that the importance of HIV/Aids in this context may be underestimated since it may not be 
listed as the primary cause of death. 
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while that of the elderly is financed almost entirely by asset-based reallocations (specifically 
asset income). The estimated accounts highlight the impact of youth unemployment in South 
Africa, which delays the rise in labour income and, as a result, the transition to surplus. The 
implication of this is that young people remain dependent on others – whether members of 
their own or other households, or the state – to finance their consumption for a longer period 
than is the norm in other countries. An extended period of economic dependence amongst 
young people is an immediate concern in terms of the additional burden placed on older 
cohorts, directly as the source of private transfers and indirectly as the ultimate source of 
public transfers. Further, the impact of youth unemployment on future earnings means that 
the ability of prime working age cohorts to generate sufficient surpluses in the future may be 
constrained. Such a scenario would have important implications for the patterns of resource 
flows in the future, limiting the ability of those cohorts to make transfers to other cohorts and 
save. 
 
One area where South Africa is quite different from other countries is the extent to which per 
capita consumption levels decline amongst the elderly. Per capita consumption declines 
from more than 80 percent of peak labour income in the mid-50s, to below 60 percent by age 
81 and continues to decline at higher ages. This continual and significant decline in 
consumption suggests weaknesses in the institutions that, in most other countries, ensure 
that consumption amongst the elderly is maintained at or close to peak levels. Essentially, 
the institutions that regulate the ‘sharing’ activity within the NTA framework – inter-household 
transfers and public transfers – appear not to ensure sufficient levels of sharing to equalise 
consumption across adult cohorts. Indeed, the sharing processes may be working against 
the elderly, who are typically located in poor households, in rural areas, and are rarely found 
to be co-resident with an adult earning above the 60th percentile of wages. Instead of 
younger generations supporting the elderly, there is evidence to suggest that households are 
often formed around recipients of the state old age pension in response to high 
unemployment (Klasen and Woolard, 2009). 
 
Based on the estimated labour income and consumption profiles, South Africa is revealed to 
be in the middle of its period of first demographic dividend. Estimated to have started in the 
mid-1970s, under medium fertility assumptions it is expected to end in around 35 years’ 
time. The second demographic dividend, which arises through greater investment in human, 
physical and financial capital, though, can permanently raise growth and living standards. 
Declining fertility has already enabled South Africa to raise investment in child health and 
education and this should positively impact productivity as these children enter the labour 
force. However, without jobs, these gains will not be realised, irrespective of their 
accumulated human capital.  
 
Economic growth underpins the creation of new job opportunities in South Africa and, 
accordingly, the state should seek to create an environment that is more supportive of 
private sector growth. While the state is an important employer in its own right, fiscal 
constraints on public sector employment growth means that the private sector is the only 
realistic source of jobs going forward. In many instances, such a recommendation is 
interpreted in the context of taxation and labour legislation, for example. While these are 
certainly relevant in South Africa, interventions in terms of greater security in the supply of 
electricity, improvements in the transportation and logistics sectors, and the facilitation of 
international trade may be just as beneficial. 
 
Growth, however, while necessary, is not a sufficient condition for greater employment. The 
pursuit of a more labour-intensive growth path represents a critical shift in South Africa's 
economic trajectory and is fundamental to the creation of employment on the required scale. 
While significant gains in terms of educational attainment have been made in the past 20 
years, the inability of the economy to absorb new labour market entrants in sufficient 
numbers represents a key limiting factor on the size of both demographic dividends. 
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The policy priorities for maximising the benefit from the dividend should be formulated in 
terms of South Africa having already transitioned through the first half of its first dividend 
period. In this respect, the policy priorities should arguably be to ramp up economic growth 
and fundamentally shift the labour intensity of production. Broad educational and health 
policies may suffer from long lead times, but there may be scope for targeted interventions 
particularly relating to post-secondary non-university education (the FET colleges in 
particular), as well as artisan training and apprenticeships that would have shorter lags. 
Further, education and training interventions that target the large group of individuals who 
leave the secondary schooling system prior to completion and provide them with marketable 
skills are essential. In health terms, continued emphasis on prevention and treatment of 
diseases such as HIV/Aids and tuberculosis will help reduce the effective dependency ratio 
by reducing morbidity amongst working age cohorts. 
 
Successful implementation of these policies will benefit the country's ability to generate a 
second dividend. The move towards mandatory retirement savings is also an important 
policy initiative in this regard. While the major infrastructural investments envisaged in South 
Africa have long lags and would boost the second dividend, they may also have significant 
employment and economic growth effects during construction. Some of the more systemic 
educational policy priorities – particularly those targeting quality improvements – would have 
more of an impact in terms of the second dividend, and this is true of many of the health and 
related interventions such as provision of housing, sanitation and water. 
 
Pool (2007, p.34) argues that the key to maximising the second dividend is “the successful 
exploitation of the first demographic dividends. The developed countries that long ago 
passed through their dividend phase . . . will vary in the degree to which they capitalised on 
these trends, and thus whether they are also likely to be the beneficiaries of the associated 
second dividend. Many will have squandered this opportunity.” With South Africa halfway 
through its first dividend period, having effectively sabotaged itself through the damage 
wrought by the apartheid system, it will hopefully not have squandered its opportunity too. 
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APPENDIX  
 
A.1  Household Survey Data 
 
The key source of information on incomes and expenditures of South African households is 
the Income and Expenditure Survey, conducted periodically by Statistics South Africa. These 
are nationally representative household surveys that collect detailed information on 
individual and household incomes and household expenditures. The First Income and 
Expenditure Survey (IES) was conducted in 1995 in conjunction with the 1995 October 
Household Survey, with the second IES conducted in 2000 in conjunction with the 
September 2000 Labour Force Survey (LFS). In both instances, it is possible to link the IES 
with the other survey conducted at that time, allowing the incorporation of a wide variety of 
labour market, socioeconomic and other household information into the dataset. 
 
The 2005/06 IES is the most recent in this series of surveys and differs in various respects 
from its two predecessors (Statistics South Africa, 2008b, p.1). Firstly, the 2005/06 IES was 
conducted over a period of twelve months from September 2005 to August 2006, with each 
household participating for one month of the period and being visited by enumerators at  
Least six times. Within each month, the national representivity of the survey was maintained. 
In contrast, the earlier IESs were conducted over a period of around five weeks, with all data 
being collected from households during a single interview. Secondly, the 2005/06 IES 
utilised the recall method as well as employing diaries to collect expenditure information, 
with each household requested to complete four weekly diaries. Earlier IESs used only the 
recall method to collect data. Thirdly, the 2005/06 IES was not conducted in conjunction with 
any other household survey, nor did it incorporate detailed socioeconomic or labour market 
information, meaning that where such information is required to generate age profiles, other 
household surveys conducted around this time will need to be utilised. With a sample of 24 
000 households, the 2005/06 IES is utilised in this study as the key source of income and 
expenditure data. 
 
Two other household surveys are utilised in this research. The first is the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS), conducted twice annually by Statistics South Africa between 2000 and 2007. 
This survey has as its focus the collection of labour market information and is the basis of 
official labour statistics for that period. The second survey is the General Household Survey 
(GHS). While this survey contains a relatively extensive labour market module, it is focussed 
on collecting data on households, their living conditions, and their access to services and 
assets, amongst other things. The GHS has been collected annually since 2002. 
 
A.2  Other Data Sources 
 
Various other sources of data are used to compile the NTA estimates for South Africa. 
These are described briefly below.  
 
Population estimates: Population estimates, detailing the number of individuals within each 
single-year age cohort, are taken from World Population Prospects (2010 Revision), 
published by the United Nations and use the medium variant on total fertility. At the time that 
this research commenced, this was the most recent data available and this data source is 
used by numerous other NTA countries. 
 
National accounts: Data from South Africa's national accounts are used to construct the 
macro or aggregate control values. These values are used to ensure that the aggregate 
value for a given NTA flow is consistent with national accounts. In essence, survey or 
administrative data is used to construct a per capita age profile for a given flow and the 
aggregate control value (a scalar value) is used to shift the age profile upwards or 
downwards so that the aggregate value of the flow equals the appropriate national accounts 
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value (i.e. per capita age profile multiplied by population structure multiplied by aggregate 
control value equals national accounts value). The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is 
responsible for publishing the country's national accounts. National accounts data was 
downloaded from the SARB online database in mid-2013, by which time no further official 
adjustments were being made to 2005 data. 
 
Administrative data: Although there is significant scope for the inclusion of detailed 
administrative data in the construction of the NTA estimates, this has not yet been done. 
Examples of such data would include, for example, the number of individuals in receipt of a 
child support grant by age or the number of individuals making use of public primary 
healthcare facilities by age. It is hoped that it will be possible to access such data going 
forward for inclusion in future iterations of this research. 
 
Other administrative data from national and provincial budgets, the South African Revenue 
Services (SARS), as well as detail from ministerial budget votes and other official 
documents, have been used in constructing these estimates. 
 
Other data: Where required, data from statistical and other releases by Statistics South 
Africa has been used, as has detail from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) and 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), both published by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
 
A.3  Data Issues 
 
One of the key challenges of this research is its incorporation of numerous data sources. 
Thus, the research is exposed to the various data issues associated with each of these data 
sources. From the perspective of the IES 2005/06, the key concern associated with 
individual-level data is the possibility of non-random measurement error. Indeed, Statistics 
South Africa has found it increasingly difficult to access wealthy households as they retreat 
behind high walls and other security measures. Despite this problem, it is not clear that this 
would necessarily affect the shape of the age profiles derived from this dataset, as wealth or 
income would need to be correlated with the age of household members. Nevertheless, 
there is a possibility that non-response by wealthier households may impact on the age 
profiles derived from this data.  
 
Expenditure data from the IES 2005/06 was also found to be somewhat problematic due to a 
significant underreporting of particularly food and personal care expenditures when 
compared to both earlier surveys and to available macro data. Indeed, the problem was 
significant enough to necessitate, for example, a 30 percent upward adjustment of food 
expenditures during the compilation of the new weights for the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
(Statistics South Africa, 2008a). This problem was associated with the introduction of the 
diary method that was used to collect these types of expenditures, instead of the recall 
method employed in both the 1995 and 2000 rounds of the survey. Statistics South Africa's 
specific adjustments of expenditure data for the construction of the CPI are taken into 
account in the construction of private consumption age profiles. 
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